基于协议代理模式下IT外包项目博弈研究

互联网经济的出现致使全球信息化水平向更高级的智能化延伸。IT外包项目对现代企业的作用毋需置疑。本文通过建立了IT外包公司与地方系统集成商间单委托—代理博弈模型,分析了双方间的IT外包项目分包费率和努力程度取值范围,并讨论了IT外包公司和地方系统集成商的行为选择。对IT外包项目的博弈分析结果对于信息化建设企业未来在外包决策时进行风险控制具有一定的借鉴意义。     

基于云重心Shapley值的供应链融资联盟收益分配研究

针对Shapley值法在供应链融资联盟收益分配过程中分配因素考虑不全以及各分配因素随机性和模糊性强的缺点，本文利用云重心法修正Shapley值的收益分配。根据供应链融资联盟收益分配的主要影响因素，在传统的Shapley值法的基础上引入了风险系数、投入成本、努力程度以及信息对称水平4个分配修正因子，弥补了影响因素的缺失，并利用云重心法计算各联盟企业的收益修正值，云重心法能够解决定性指标和定量指标之间的模糊性转换，极大克服了Shapley值法自身的局限性。算例对比结果发现，改进的Shapley值法能更加合理的分配收益，有利于维持供应链融资联盟的稳定。     

金融机构集聚过程的动态博弈分析

在理性行为人收益最大化原则条件下得出了行为人空间博弈的结果——在均衡状态,限制性条件(如运输技术等)能够产生一个收敛的空间区位调整过程,最终实现空间集聚。在这个博弈集聚的过程中,外部因素存在发生作用的空间,从而说明了政策制定者可以通过制定相关的政策来影响金融机构的集聚过程,进而促进金融市场的深化发展和金融中心的形成。这一空间集聚过程也可用于分析城镇化的形成和发展过程。     

Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities

A rather general class of strategic games is described where the coalitional improvements are acyclic and hence strong Nash equilibria exist: The players derive their utilities from the use of certain facilities; all players using a facility extract the same amount of local utility therefrom, which amount depends both on the set of users and on their actions, and is decreasing in the set of users; the ultimate utility of each player is the minimum of the local utilities at all relevant facilities. Two important subclasses are “games with structured utilities,” basic properties of which were discovered in 1970s and 1980s, and “bottleneck congestion games,” which attracted researchers’ attention quite recently. The former games are representative in the sense that every game from the whole class is isomorphic to one of them. The necessity of the minimum aggregation for the existence of strong Nash equilibria, actually, just Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, in all games of this type is established.     

重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中的公众参与博弈

为改善重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中公众参与现状,从社会稳定风险评估3个主要利益主体——中央政府、地方政府与公众不同的利益诉求出发,运用演化博弈模型,探讨在不同利益诉求的相互作用下影响地方政府与公众在社会稳定风险评估中策略选择的因素。研究发现,当公众受到的损失大于参与付出的成本时,双方稳定均衡状态均表现积极,反之,双方可能均表现为消极或积极这两种截然不同的状态。基于此,分析了中央政府对地方政府和公众在社会稳定风险评估博弈中策略选择的影响。最后,提出应加大对地方政府的支持、规范公众参与相关制度、加大教育培训及宣传力度、创新公众参与方式几项政策建议。     

REAL OPTIONS WITH COMPETITION AND REGIME SWITCHING

In this paper, we examine irreversible investment decisions in duopoly games with a variable economic climate. Integrating timing flexibility, competition, and changes in the economic environment in the form of a cash flow process with regime switching, the problem is formulated as a stopping‐time game under Stackelberg leader‐follower competition, in which both players determine their respective optimal market entry time. By extending the variational inequality approach, we solve for the free boundaries and obtain optimal investment strategies for each player. Despite the lack of regularity in the leader's obstacle and the cash flow regime uncertainty, the regime‐dependent optimal policies for both the leader and the follower are obtained. In addition, we perform comprehensive numerical experiments to demonstrate the properties of solutions and to gain insights into the implications of regime switching.     

Rural development and the role of game farming in the Eastern Cape,South Africa

The analysis of game farming is set in the Eastern Cape, South Africa. Game farming reorders the use, meaning and value of land and animal species. However, what it means for rural development processes in the immediate region and beyond is not well accounted for. We perceive game farming as an assemblage that brings together new actors, new forms of land use and new discourses. We argue that although game farming has generated new opportunities and new forms of added value to the available resources (e.g. eco-tourism, trophy hunting, game-meat production), situated in the history and contemporary context of the Eastern Cape, it is a contested, and from a development point of view, problematic land-use practice. We argue that game farming constrains land and agrarian reforms: the distribution of land and income remains skewed; ‘poaching’ occurs and game farms do not, or only minimally, generate new and badly needed employment opportunities. The game farm has emerged as an exclusive, globally well-connected space. The nature of the relationships this space maintains with the surrounding communities is, however, such that the overall contribution to rural development in South Africa is questionable.     

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.     

抵押物处置与农房抵押贷款困境：基于演化博弈的分析

研究目的:分析农民住房财产权抵押(简称农房抵押)贷款困境的主要原因以及抵押物处置对农房抵押贷款行为的影响机理。研究方法:演化博弈论。研究结果:农房抵押贷款发展面临困境的关键在于金融机构惜贷,而抵押物处置难是激发金融机构惜贷的重要原因,但是降低抵押物处置难度只是推动农房抵押贷款发展的必要而非充分条件。研究结论:要促进农房抵押贷款发展,除了必须降低抵押物处置难度外,还需要构建完善的农房抵押贷款制度体系。     

乡村森林旅游项目升级发展过程政商博弈探微——基于Z风景区3A创4A的案例分析

以Z风景区3A创4A愿景中当地政府与风景区经营商两个主体的决策行为为研究对象,以制度经济学为理论基础,采用博弈论模型进行分析。结果表明:在政府和经营商目标不一致的前提下,从政府来说,在政绩驱动下急于达到创4A目标,但政府又不能滥用纳税人的钱追加投资,其意愿是让商家继续投资,为创4A发力;从商家来说,虽然创4A有利于项目营利空间,但是客观上有规避未来市场不确定性和投资回报周期长双重风险的意识,还可能由于政府对项目创4A的急切性,导致商家存在"政府有可能追加投资,自己"搭便车"的"等靠要"机会主义思想,追加投资意愿不高;反过来也可能存在政府等待商家投资的搭便车行为。为此,提出以政商共同利益最大化为目标,通过改变激励措施,使政商博弈达到合作状态下较优的均衡结果。